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Does the new technological paradigm based on information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) create new windows of opportunity or further obstacles for 
catching up countries? The paper discusses this question by taking neo-Schumpeterian 
long wave theory as the basic framework of analysis. According to this approach, the 
current rapid diffusion of the ICT-based paradigm marks the initial phase of a fifth 
long wave period. The first part of the paper focuses on the major changes that 
characterize the techno-economic system in the fifth long wave, and points out that 
the new paradigm is leading to several new opportunities for developing economies. 
If public policies will actively foster the development process by rapidly investing in 
the new technologies and in the related infrastructures and skills, these new 
opportunities will indeed be successfully exploited. The second part of the paper 
shifts the focus to the socio-institutional system, and argues that institutional changes 
driven by some major actors in the industrialized world are creating a new 
international regime where the scope and the resources available for State 
interventions are significantly reduced. The paper concludes by suggesting the 
existence of a temporary mismatch between the techno-economic and the socio-
institutional system, which makes the catching up process more difficult for large 
parts of the developing world.  
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Information and communication technologies have started to diffuse rapidly in the 
economic system in the last two decades. They have originated from the fast 
technological developments in the semiconductor industry, in the telecommunication 
sector and, more recently, in a wide range of new services linked to multimedia and 
the Internet [1]. The convergence of these three streams of technological advances, 
commonly referred to as ICTs, may arguably constitute the rise of a new 
‘technological paradigm’ [2].  
A technological paradigm is a set of interrelated and pervasive innovations that 
increases productivity in many sectors of the economy [3,4]. The new technological 
paradigm based on ICTs may have important economic effects on growth, wealth and 
welfare in the near future, and may lead to radical changes in firms’ production 
structure and organizations, in the patterns of consumption, and in institutional 
settings.  
One major question relates to the consequences that the diffusion of ICTs have for 
catching up and developing economies. Does the new technological paradigm based 
on ICTs create new windows of opportunity or further obstacles for catching up 
countries? The answer to this question is a matter of considerable controversy in the 
literature on innovation and catching up, and it is rather difficult to discuss because of 
the fundamental elements of uncertainty, complexity and unpredictability that it 
entails. It is possible to identify, by and large, two different positions in this respect. 
The first is a more optimistic stand, which stresses the new windows of opportunity 
opened up to catching up countries by the creation and diffusion of the new 
information and communication technologies. This position is founded upon the old 
argument in the catching up literature of the “penalty of taking the lead” [5]. 
  1According to this, developing countries may exploit their backward position by 
imitating and implementing advanced foreign technologies created by the leader 
economies, and by rapidly investing in the new technologies. In the new era, catching 
up countries are less committed to the mass production technological paradigm 
prevailing in previous decades (in terms of investments in physical capital, 
machineries, and infrastructures), so that they may find it easier to make the jump into 
the new technological system based on ICTs. Anticipating future changes in the 
patterns of global competition, Carlota Perez pointed out already two decades ago the 
new possibilities open up for developing countries in the era of ICTs because for 
them, she argued,  
 
it is possible to attempt a direct entry without going through the technological stages it 
leaves behind […]. The new technologies allow ‘leapfrogging’ for some of the countries 
that do not carry the inertia of the previous industrial structure […] The transformation in 
the relative cost structure changes both comparative advantages and comparative 
disadvantages. For each country, this implies a fundamental rethinking of its relative 
advantage position within the new techno-economic paradigm to identify new 
possibilities [6, p. 457]. 
 
The rapid catching up process of Asian NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries, such as 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) in the last few decades shows that the opportunities 
opened up by the diffusion of the ICT-based paradigm can indeed be successfully 
exploited by catching up countries, provided that the development strategy that they 
pursue emphasizes the need to actively invest in the new technologies and in the 
related infrastructures and skills. The tigerish growth of China and, to a less extent, 
India in the last decade provides more recent examples of the importance of ICT-
related manufacturing and service activities for the catching up process. 
  2These successful cases, however, contrast with the general pattern of increasing 
disparities in income and technology levels that the world economy has experienced 
in the last few decades [7,8]. A large group of less developed economies, mostly in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, have in fact been growing at a rather slow pace, and 
the technology and income gap has therefore significantly widened for many of them. 
Several countries have very low levels of technological capabilities, infrastructures 
and education, and consequently find it hard to exploit their backwardness position by 
imitating ICT-related foreign advanced technologies. 
There thus exists a second position in the catching up literature that is less optimistic 
with respects to the current and future prospects for innovation- and imitation-based 
growth. This is founded upon a strand of historically oriented studies on technological 
development, growth and catching up [9,10,11]. Historical evidence indicates that 
economic development is far from being an automatic and easy process, and that it is 
on the contrary very demanding and costly. This second stand therefore looks with 
greater concern at the social and institutional factors that may hamper the catching up 
process. In this respect, it is argued, the new paradigm based on information and 
communication technologies is creating as many new obstacles for development as 
the opportunities it opens up. The process of creation of new technologies and its 
international diffusion are currently more difficult to exploit for catching up countries, 
due to the greater requirement in terms of skills, competencies and capabilities that 
modern ICT-based global competition requires [12]. In particular, the international 
diffusion of technologies, which has been a major factor of catching up in previous 
decades,  
 
seems to have become more ‘difficult’ and demanding over time. […] This may be a 
reflection of the radical technological change in the last decades, with ICT-based 
  3solutions substituting earlier mechanical and electromechanical ones, and the derived 
change in the demand for skills and infrastructures [13, p. 1303]. 
 
The present paper conceives these two arguments as largely complementary to each 
other, rather than opposite, as they look at different relevant aspects of the catching up 
process. By taking these two previous positions as a conceptual starting point, the 
paper aims at discussing the new opportunities and further obstacles that the 
emergence of the new ICT-based technological paradigm creates for catching up 
countries.  
The discussion will take the neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory as the basic 
framework of analysis. Neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory flourished in the 1980s 
[4,14], following the previous seminal work of Schumpeter on business cycles [15].
1 
According to this approach, the capitalist system is constituted by two related sub-
systems, the techno-economic and the socio-institutional. It is the joint evolution of 
these sub-systems to determine the ‘mode of development’, and consequently the rise 
and fall of long waves in the long run. In particular, neo-Schumpeterian long wave 
theory explains countries’ long run macroeconomic performances in terms of the 
diffusion to the whole economic system of families of interrelated radical innovations, 
that is the technological paradigms. When a new technological paradigm emerges, 
there is a big impulse in the techno-economic sub-system to adopt the new best 
practice technology with high profit prospects. However, by its own nature, the 
techno-economic system is more rapid to adopt changes, while the socio-institutional 
one may take a longer time before introducing the modifications required by the new 
                                                 
1 Since the beginning of 1980s, Futures has published several articles contributing to the debate on long 
wave theory, and particularly to its neo-Schumpeterian version [14,16,17]. Dator [18] reviews the 
debate on long waves with special emphasis on the articles appeared in Futures in the 1980s and 1990s. 
More recent contributions include Linstone [19] and Dewick et al. [20]. For a discussion of the 
relationships between this and other theoretical perspectives in innovation studies, see Castellacci et al. 
[21].  
  4technological style. The mismatch between the two systems may retard the large-scale 
introduction of the new paradigm, precisely because some social, organizational and 
institutional changes are necessary before it can diffuse to the whole economy [22].  
According to several accounts (e.g. [2]), the current rapid diffusion of the ICT-based 
paradigm marks the initial phase of a fifth long wave, and thus provides new growth 
opportunities for many countries in the world economy. However, what matters for 
long run growth and development in the fifth long wave is not the pace of ICT 
creation and diffusion as such, but rather the dynamic complementarities existing 
between the ICT paradigm and a set of other socio-institutional characteristics that 
greatly shape and affect the growth process.  
Following this neo-Schumpeterian perspective, the major question examined in the 
paper, on the consequences of the emergence of the ICT-based paradigm for catching 
up countries, will be rephrased by discussing whether there currently exists a good 
match between the techno-economic and the socio-institutional system, and what the 
implications of this are for developing countries.  
The contribution that the paper intends to give to the neo-Schumpeterian long wave 
literature is twofold. First, it will bring together several relevant aspects characterizing 
the new ICT-based technological paradigm, and try to provide an integrated view of 
the emerging ‘mode of development’. Secondly, it will apply the neo-Schumpeterian 
long wave theory to the international dimension, and use it to discuss the 
opportunities and challenges that catching up countries face in the fifth long wave.
2
                                                 
2 With a few exceptions [4,23,24,25], in fact, long wave theory has never focused on the international 
dimension. The application of this theoretical perspective to the analysis of growth rate differences 
across countries is important because it points to the paradigmatic nature of the process of innovation 
and catching up. The latter process is deeply rooted in a given historical context, and can therefore be 
better understood by looking at the emergence and diffusion of technological paradigms, and at the rise 
and fall of long waves.  
  5The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will describe some major features that 
characterize the ICT-based techno-economic system, the new windows of opportunity 
that these open up for developing countries, and the new challenges that these create 
for policy makers to foster and sustain the catching up process. Section 3 will then 
discuss some recent trends and changes in the socio-institutional domain, particularly 
in the international regime, and the implications that these have for public policies in 
catching up countries. Finally, section 4 will conclude the paper by pointing to the 
existence of a mismatch between the techno-economic and the socio-institutional 
system. The former, in fact, requires new and more active forms of State intervention 
to sustain the catching up process, while changes in the latter tend to decrease the 
scope and the resources available for public policies.  
 
 
2. The ICT-based techno-economic system 
Information and communication technologies are diffusing rapidly in the economic 
system. According to neo-Schumpeterian theory [2,26], the current rapid diffusion of 
the ICT-based technological paradigm is one major factor leading to the rise of a fifth 
long wave period, which will span for the next few decades. A widespread adoption 
of ICTs, in this view, will lead to radical changes in the patterns of production and 
distribution in the near future, and these transformations are likely to determine 
important consequences not only in the industrialized world, but for catching up 
countries as well. This section focuses on the major characteristics of the changing 
techno-economic system, and, relatedly, on the new windows of opportunity opened 
up for developing countries, and on the new challenges that policy makers have to 
face to sustain the catching up process in the fifth long wave.  
  6 
2.1 A more intangible and information intensive production 
Differently from the previous mass-production technological paradigm, which had a 
strong energy and materials intensity [10,11], the new paradigm based on ICTs is 
characterized by great information intensity [2,6]. An important consequence of this is 
the rise of importance of intangible assets and productive factors [27]. These changes 
towards an information intensive and intangible knowledge-based economy may open 
up new windows of opportunities for catching up countries, and, consequently, 
determine new challenges for policy. Three main aspects appear to have a particular 
importance in this respect. 
First, the knowledge-based economy is less dependent on raw materials and natural 
resources.
3 This makes the catching up process possible even for countries that are 
not well endowed in terms of natural resources and raw materials. Important changes 
in the patterns of comparative and competitive advantages may occur, as human skills 
and knowledge become the key factors to compete in the international arena. 
However, as human skills and knowledge increase their importance, there is the 
growing risk that countries with better levels of education and human capital may use 
them to rapidly improve their economic performance, while less developed countries 
find it more difficult to catch up by cumulatively improving their knowledge assets. A 
large literature in innovation studies has in fact shown that the process of creation of 
technological knowledge is dynamic and cumulative [29,30], so that knowledge-based 
growth may risk of leading to growing disparities between rich and poor countries. In 
                                                 
3 Berkhout and Hertin [28] observe that the progressive substitution of information for materials and 
energy has been discussed in the literature by using two similar concepts, i.e. ‘de-materialisation’ and 
‘virtualisation’. According to them, the former term may be a more precise characterization of the 
current trends in the knowledge-based economy, as de-materialised products and services do not 
completely substitute the traditional devices, but more frequently tend to complement and integrate 
them. 
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and training policies, aimed at enhancing technological capabilities and at improving 
absorptive capacities of follower countries. Education and training policies have 
always been important to foster economic development, but in the modern 
knowledge-based economy tend to become an even more relevant instrument for 
policy makers to sustain the catching up process. 
A second window of opportunity is provided by the fact that besides the traditional 
form of infrastructure, based on tangible assets and communication channels, the new 
ICT-based technological paradigm is increasingly dependent on an intangible type of 
infrastructure and communication system, based on high speed transmission of data.  
 
The name we now give to this emergent information infrastructures is cyberspace, the 
electronic culture of computers and networks, information systems and software, that 
exists on the Internet. Cyberspace […] is to the fifth long wave what railroads were to the 
third and highways/airways have been to the fourth [31, p. 307]. 
 
A recent important technological trajectory in the development of the cyberspace is 
the rapid diffusion of wireless communication channels, such as mobile phones and 
wireless Internet connections, whose supporting infrastructure is based on satellite 
communication and mobile telephone networks. In future perspective, we may expect 
these virtual networks and the related new infrastructures to complement and, to a 
large extent, even substitute the traditional infrastructures and communication 
channels.  
These changes may provide new opportunities for countries with a low level of 
traditional infrastructures, if they will be able to heavily and rapidly invest in the new 
technologies of communication, particularly in wireless-related devices [32]. There 
exist several examples of information and communication technologies that have been 
  8recently developed in the Indian context and that have the potential to rapidly diffuse 
in the developing world: the ‘Cor-Dect’ (a cheap wireless local loop product), the 
‘simputer’ (a shared computing device for multiple users in a rural community), and 
the ‘n-Logue’ (which provides telecom and Internet service to rural areas).
4  
What these successful cases indicate is that ICTs can indeed provide new 
opportunities for economic development in catching up countries. The new 
investments that are necessary to build up and develop the new infrastructures, 
though, have to cover large initial costs that may be difficult to sustain for local firms. 
An active effort of the State, and particularly of the public system of S&T, may 
therefore be of great importance in sustaining this process, especially in the initial 
phase when foreign advanced technologies need to be adapted to local contexts. 
Thirdly, and related to the previous points, a catching up country that is less 
committed to the previous technological paradigm, in the sense that it has invested 
less resources in infrastructures and physical capital related to the technological 
system prevailing in previous decades, may have better opportunities to rapidly 
transform its productive structure towards the new activities. In addition, the fixed 
investments required to enter the new ICT-based paradigm are lower than those 
needed to compete in the mass production technological system [6]. The information 
intensive and intangible characteristics of the knowledge-based economy may thus 
enable a more rapid process of structural change, and determine possible advantages 
for latecomers. The opportunities arising from rapid structural change are not 
confined to the emergence of ICT-related advanced manufacturing and service 
                                                 
4 Several articles have recently appeared in Futures on the relationships between ICT-related 
infrastructures and economic development. For an interesting discussion of some of the successful 
cases and of the new opportunities that they provide for the growth of India and other developing 
countries, see [33] and [34]. For a related discussion of the need to adapt ICT technologies and 
infrastructures to different local contexts, and particularly that of African countries, see [35] and [36]. 
Taking a longer-term perspective, Rimmer [37] presents a study of the important role played by 
infrastructural investments for the catching up process of China. 
  9industries, but refer also to the productivity gains that the use of ICTs may lead to in 
traditional and low-tech sectors, which still account for a large share of production 
and employment in many catching up countries [38]. 
However, the rapid process of transformation of the economy may lead to greater 
risks of technological unemployment, i.e. to the possibility that workers that were 
previously employed in primary or low-tech manufacturing activities find it difficult 
to improve their skills and competencies in a relatively short period of time, so to be 
employed in the more technologically advanced sectors [39,40]. It is therefore 
important that the State undertakes an active effort to promote training and re-training 
policies with the purpose of enabling a more rapid shift of labour resources towards 
the more advanced activities [12].
5
 
2.2 The flexible production system 
The new ICT-based paradigm determines a shift from the mass production to the 
flexible production system. The mass production system, the dominant form of 
production during the Fordist era, was characterized by the exploitation of economies 
of scale linked to plants’ size, and by a type of predominantly producer-defined 
products [41,42]. The adoption of ICTs in the productive process, it has been argued, 
determines important changes in the production patterns, and favours the shift towards 
the flexible production system. In the latter, economies of scope and of specialization 
based on flexibility replace the more traditional economies of scale based on plants’ 
                                                 
5 The catching up process that China has experienced in recent years is frequently pointed out as an 
example of a rapid process of structural change, with a massive shift of cheap labour supply from 
primary activities to traditional and low-tech industries. The most recent developments, however, 
indicate that the rapid technological upgrading of manufacturing industries is progressively leading to a 
greater importance of high-tech sectors in the economy, which require highly skilled labour that it is 
not easily available in the Chinese labour market. This may possibly constitute a bottleneck for the 
further expansion of the economy in the near future, which Chinese public authorities and foreign firms 
investing in the country should both look at with concern (The Economist, April 16
th 2005).  
  10size; real time and on-line monitoring of demand substitutes the previous periodic 
planning of production; and the productive system tends increasingly to be user- 
rather than producer-defined [2,6,43]. These transformations are the results of flexible 
production capabilities and of greater information intensity of equipments and 
products. 
As a consequence of these changes, the accumulation of physical capital, which has 
traditionally been regarded as the major factor of growth in mainstream growth 
theory, becomes a relatively less important engine of economic development in the 
modern knowledge-based economy. The latter is in fact more dependent on human 
skills and competencies, user-producer interactions, learning by using and learning by 
interacting mechanisms, and the related investments in intangible and advanced 
knowledge assets [27].  
This opens up new possibilities for technological and economic catching up for those 
countries that will be able to exploit the advantages of the flexible production system 
[44]. An important push in this direction must be provided by active efforts of the 
State to improve consumers’ and users’ competencies, which become a fundamental 
factor of competitive advantage in the knowledge-based economy. It is important, 
more in general, that public policies in catching up countries adopt a systemic 
understanding of the innovation process, which naturally leads to focus the attention 
on user-producer interactions. A systemic understanding of innovative activities is in 
fact well established in the academic and policy debate in more advanced countries, 
particularly in Europe, but its wider diffusion to the developing world has not been 
realized yet [21,45]. 
 
 
  112.3 The rise of the service sectors 
Strictly related to those discussed above, another major trend in modern capitalism is 
the rise of the service sectors. These account now for about two thirds of employment 
in most industrialized countries, and, more importantly, they are playing a more 
relevant role for the creation and diffusion of advanced knowledge [46,47]. In fact, 
while service industries have traditionally been conceived as productivity laggards 
and as passive adopters of the advanced technologies developed in manufacturing 
industries (which were often considered as the main engine of growth, see [48]), more 
recent trends indicate the increasing role that services are taking in the process of 
technological and economic catching up [13].  
As the process of structural change goes on, service industries assume greater 
significance and an increasing share in the overall production and employment not 
only in major industrialized countries, which are leading these trends, but in catching 
up countries as well. India is a well-known example of a developing economy where 
ICT-related advanced services are playing an increasingly relevant role in the 
catching up process. Districts like Bangalore, Hyderabad and Gurgaon have become 
hubs for IT services (e.g. software development, call centres, backroom operations) 
that have attracted many large foreign companies [34,49]. Could the Indian 
experience be generalized to other developing countries in the near future, and what 
are the reasons to believe that this may be the case? 
The rise of services may provide new windows of opportunity for follower countries 
for at least three main reasons. The first is the strict relationship between the 
development of ICTs and the rise of services [50,51]. Many service activities have 
recently improved both the efficiency of the productive process and the quality of the 
provided service by adopting ICTs in their back-off operations [47,52]. Barras [53] 
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may be described by a “reverse product cycle model”, where ICTs lead first to 
improved efficiency, then to improved quality, and, eventually, to totally new 
services. The reverse sequence of the product cycle for the case of services as 
opposed to manufacturing industries has important implications: standardisation 
becomes less important, while the ‘customisation’ of services takes greater 
significance over time [54]. Customisation implies that services are designed and 
improved in strict relationship to the clients’ and users’ needs, and that entirely new 
services arise from user-producer interactions (so-called ‘ad-hoc’ innovations, see 
[55]). 
Thus, similarly to what observed above in relation to the characteristics of the flexible 
production system, human skills and competencies, user-producer interactions, 
learning by using and learning by interacting mechanisms become the dominant 
factors of competitive advantages in the service economy. This opens up new 
opportunities for catching up countries, provided that public policies will favour the 
exploitation of this potential by improving users’ competencies, and by sustaining and 
promoting user-producer interactions, which is a key policy requirement according to 
a systemic understanding of the innovative process. 
The second reason why the rise of the service sectors may provide new windows of 
opportunity for developing countries is the limited appropriability of innovation in 
service activities [46]. The conditions of appropriability in service industries are to a 
large extent different than those prevailing in manufacturing sectors, precisely due to 
the intangible nature, the high information content, and the closer user-producer 
interactions that characterize service activities. These features make it more difficult 
to appropriate the benefits of innovative activities in services, and traditional forms of 
  13protection, such as patents, become therefore less effective. While this may hinder the 
innovative process by decreasing the incentives to innovate (the “incentive effect”), 
the other side of the coin is that the scope for imitation and knowledge diffusion may 
be greater in the service economy, both within services and towards manufacturing 
industries (the so-called “efficiency effect”; see [56]). The latter mechanism may turn 
out to be an important source of aggregate productivity growth and structural change 
as the service sectors expand their share of total production and employment. 
Catching up countries may exploit these new opportunities by imitating the advanced 
services produced in the leader countries, as well as by enhancing the diffusion of 
knowledge across sectors within the economy. 
The risk of this development strategy is obviously that of decreasing the incentives for 
innovators, thus making the national system of innovation too dependent on foreign 
advanced technologies. A sustainable catching up process must therefore be 
accompanied by public policies aimed to provide incentives to innovative and R&D 
activities of national firms, to sustain, more in general, the development of local 
entrepreneurships, and to design an appropriate system of regulation of intellectual 
property rights. 
There is also a third important characteristic of the service economy that may turn out 
to have important consequences for catching up. In service industries, it is frequently 
argued, besides technological capabilities, non-technological types of knowledge are 
important as well [46,47]. Non-technological types of knowledge are those that do not 
have an ultimate scientific and engineering base. One such types of knowledge is the 
ability to organize and re-organize productive activities in a complex and uncertain 
environment, namely organizational capabilities [57]. Other non-technological types 
of knowledge that constitute important factors of competitive advantages in many 
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about consumers’ habits and tastes, about national institutions and regulations, and so 
on. Gallouj points out that improvements in these types of knowledge and capabilities 
may lead to a sort of ‘expertise-field innovation’, whose result is the “opening up of 
new markets, the diversification (internal and external) or renewal of product ranges, 
and the creation of a competitive advantage or monopoly in terms of knowledge and 
expertise” [58, p.133].  
An important example of this type of innovation is provided by ‘knowledge intensive 
business services’ (KIBS). These are often considered as a ‘second knowledge 
infrastructure’ in the knowledge-based economy. They include the business services 
that are founded upon highly specialised and context-specific knowledge in a wide 
range of diverse activities (e.g. administrative, legal, marketing, Web and Internet, 
software and computer services, information and training services; [47]). According 
to the Community Innovation Survey, KIBS firms have been among the most active 
innovators in the European economy in the 1990s. Consultancy services, in addition, 
turn out to be the second most important source of technology for manufacturing 
firms in Europe. There is therefore robust empirical evidence, at least in the context of 
the industrialized world, supporting the idea that KIBS play an important role not only 
for the direct production of specialised knowledge, but for its rapid diffusion as well.  
Catching up countries may thus exploit these new opportunities by trying to rapidly 
promote not only science- and engineering-related technical knowledge, but also non-
technological types of knowledge, which may eventually favour the development of 
modern and competitive KIBS. Here again, public policies have an important role to 
play in this respect: first, because the public system of basic and advanced education 
has the concrete possibility to develop and to enhance the education level of the 
  15workforce; secondly, because the State may actively enable the development of a 
modern training and re-training system in the private sector, so to accelerate the 
process of structural change towards the new knowledge intensive service activities.  
 
2.4 Organizational changes: the network-firm and the e-commerce 
Besides the several technological changes described above, the new paradigm based 
on information and communication technologies is characterized by some important 
organizational changes as well. One of these, arguably the most relevant, is that ICTs 
favour a stricter connection and a more rapid communication between economic 
agents situated in different locations. Castells [59] and Freeman and Louca [2] argue 
that ‘networking’, both within the firm and in its external relations, may turn out to be 
a major feature of the new technological paradigm. Networks take different forms, 
such as partnership between firms, their cooperation with customers and users, or with 
subcontractors and employees, and they also favour the integration of different 
functions within the same firm [6]. ICT-based networking is characterized by an 
increased speed of communication, and by a rapid access to new and wider sources of 
information. This gives great advantages to the participants of a network, which may 
exploit a much greater pool of knowledge than it would be the case if they were 
operating as individual agents. 
Organizational changes are not only important for the supply side of the economy, but 
for the demand side as well. ICTs make it possible the on-line monitoring of demand, 
which substitutes the previous practice of periodic planning and makes it possible the 
development of the flexible production system, where users and consumers, as 
discussed above, take an increasingly important role. The current rapid development 
of e-commerce, in addition, may in the future determine radical transformations in the 
  16distribution chain, and, consequently, in the patterns of competition in global markets 
[60].  
It is rather difficult to predict the implications of these organizational changes for the 
development process. On the one hand, ICT-based networking between firms may 
open up new opportunities for the developing world to gain access to new and wider 
sources of advanced knowledge in global production chains, provided that private 
enterprises in catching up countries will be able to develop the advanced skills and 
capabilities that are required to cooperate and to participate in networks with more 
advanced firms in the leader countries. The diffusion of e-commerce may also provide 
new opportunities for emerging markets, as it may favour the commercialisation of 
products and services produced in peripheral regions of the world economy. Without 
the possibilities offered by web-based virtual shops, in fact, these peripheral products 
and services would simply be not visible in the industrialized world, and would 
therefore be excluded from the competition process in the international arena. 
On the other hand, however, these opportunities are rather difficult to exploit, and 
they may very well turn out to be factors of greater competitive advantage for private 
firms of the leader countries. In fact, the network-type of organization of the 
productive process, as well as the e-commerce-related organizational changes on the 
demand side, do not per se overcome the issue of power relations within the networks 
[2,61]. If some of the participants to a global production network have an initial 
advantage in terms of, say, advanced capabilities, resources and economic power, 
then the network may turn out to be a vehicle of cumulative growth where the 
strongest participants will increase their power and market shares over time, while the 
less endowed participants will shrink [31]. This risk is in fact real if we think of the 
great power gained in recent decades by multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are 
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distribution networks. Thus, the new opportunities offered by the rise of the ‘network 
firm’ and by the diffusion of e-commerce may be better exploited by catching up 
countries if their Governments will play an active role as regulators of the competitive 
process by promoting greater competition and enhancing efficiency, particularly in 
those markets where the extraordinary power gained by MNEs determines an 
oligopolistic structure and an unbalanced relation of power within firms’ networks 
[62]. 
 
2.5 The globalisation of technological activities  
The important changes described above occur in the context of the increasing 
interdependence between national economies, namely economic globalisation. One of 
the important transformations that the latter is leading to in the techno-economic 
sphere is the globalisation of technological activities. This refers to the fact that “the 
generation, transmission and diffusion of technologies is increasingly international in 
scope” [63, p.121]. The main reason why innovative activities are becoming more 
global in scope is that technical feasibility has increased significantly in the ICT-
based paradigm, while economic costs have been dramatically reduced [2]. Following 
Archibugi and Michie [64] and Archibugi and Iammarino [65], the globalisation of 
innovative activities can be described by using a three-category taxonomy. Based on 
the latter, this section considers the implications that each of the three channels of 
globalisation of technology may have for catching up countries, in terms of new 
opportunities as well as new challenges for policy.
6  
                                                 
6 On the consequences of the globalisation of technological activities for the environment, see the 
recent study of Miozzo et al. [43], which focuses on past technological trajectories and future trends in 
the textiles and chemical industries. 
  18The first channel of globalisation of innovative activities is the international 
exploitation of technology, which may be regarded as the technological equivalent of 
international trade flows. This occurs when a new technology is exported in order to 
exploit the relative benefits in the world markets. The innovation being exploited in 
international markets can be either embodied in exported high-tech products, or in 
disembodied form (e.g. sale of licences, patents and know-how). Empirical evidence 
indicates that both aspects have dramatically increased in the last decades [66,67].  
The trends towards a global ICT-based competition may have important implications 
for catching up. On the one hand, some small open economies have been able to catch 
up rapidly in the last few decades by shifting their productive structure and 
specialization patterns towards the technologically most progressive industries (e.g. 
electronics). These countries, such as Northern EU (Finland, Ireland) and Asian NICs 
(Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), have greatly and rapidly improved their production 
capabilities in ICT-related technologies, and this has made it possible for them to 
become competitive in global production networks, and to exploit economies of scale 
in foreign markets. The export-led and knowledge intensive characteristics of the 
catching up process in these countries have led to a great deal of interest in this type 
of development strategy, strongly based on large firms’ high-tech leadership in global 
production and distribution networks. Recent research has shown, in particular, that 
these countries have been able to exploit the windows of opportunity provided by the 
development and diffusion of the ICT-based paradigm through the active 
implementation of public policies that have rapidly improved the education level 
(particularly tertiary education in science and engineerings), increased the resources 
devoted to R&D expenditures, upgraded the technological infrastructures, expanded 
the employment opportunities for highly educated workers, and targeted emerging 
  19and progressive sectors through industrial policies, especially in the initial phase of 
the catching up process [12,68].  
On the other hand, seen from the point of view of the host economy, this first channel 
of globalisation of innovation may provide new opportunities for catching up through 
imports of high-tech product and machineries, as well as by attracting FDI from more 
technologically advanced countries. These channels of international technology 
diffusion have frequently been pointed out as possible sources of knowledge 
spillovers and growth of host economies. A well-known fact pointed out in this 
literature, though, is that the process of technology transfer towards less developed 
economies is not an easy and automatic outcome, but it requires the upgrading of 
capabilities and absorptive capacities of local firms. An active involvement of the 
State in the process of upgrading of domestic technological capabilities, skills and 
infrastructures is therefore a fundamental requirement for catching up [69]. Besides 
supporting the process of upgrading of local absorptive capabilities, public policies in 
developing countries can also spur international technology transfers by providing 
incentives to selected FDI and to their learning-enhancing modes of operation, and by 
negotiating on imports, IPRs and licences with foreign firms [70].  
The second channel of globalisation of innovative activities is the global generation 
of technology, i.e. the process by which MNEs internationalise their R&D activities. 
This can be regarded as the technological equivalent of FDI, and it is realized either 
when MNEs move part of their R&D labs abroad, thus setting up global research 
networks, or when they acquire existing R&D labs in host countries [71]. Empirical 
evidence shows that even this second channel of globalisation of innovation is 
assuming greater importance over time [66,72].  
  20Developing countries have the possibility to exploit the global generation of 
technology by trying to attract investments related to R&D activities of foreign MNEs 
that could have, at least in principle, a positive effect on local firms by enhancing 
their technological capabilities. The learning effect related to this second channel, 
however, can only be exploited if catching up countries have a sufficient level of 
infrastructures and educated workforce, which would make it possible to attract 
foreign R&D labs and to enjoy the relative benefits in the host economy. The 
existence of a few successful cases (e.g. Texas Instruments and Microsoft locating 
part of their R&D labs in the high-tech district of Bangalore, India) points to the fact 
that these new opportunities are better exploited in countries where public policies 
actively favour the creation of a dynamic learning environment. Public policies in this 
respect can take a variety of different forms, such as providing real incentives to the 
location of new innovative activities with foreign capital, upgrading S&T 
infrastructures and institutions, supplying qualified workforce, and associating MNEs 
centers to hubs of specific knowledge and industrial firms located in host countries 
[65]. 
The third channel of globalisation of new technologies is constituted by techno-
scientific collaborations [63]. These can be undertaken either by private firms (e.g. 
through joint ventures for innovative projects, or through agreements with exchange 
of technical information and/or equipment), or by the public research sector (e.g. 
through international scientific projects and R&D networks, international flows of 
students and researchers, etc.). Here again, empirical evidence indicates a rapid 
increase in the internationalisation of both private research and public science [71,73]. 
Differently from the previous two channels of globalisation of innovation, which 
entail an increasing process of competition between countries in the world economy, 
  21techno-scientific collaborations enable learning, knowledge diffusion and economic 
growth in both countries participating to a joint venture, and thus favour the 
emergence and intensification of new forms of collaboration in the international 
arena. In such a positive sum game, international cooperation is increasingly 
becoming a major source of competitive advantage, and catching up countries have 
therefore the concrete possibility to exploit this opportunity to augment their stock of 
advanced scientific and technological knowledge.  
For a developing economy, the best way to do so is to enhance domestic 
competencies, capabilities and infrastructures, so to increase its effective participation 
to the new forms of collaborations in the global arena. Policies at the national level 
may use several different instruments to achieve this objective, such as promoting 
international scientific projects and exchange programmes, increasing student flows to 
more technologically advanced countries (and giving them real incentives to go back 
home after the end of their education period abroad, so to avoid risks of brain drain), 
participating to international organizations (for the development of S&T, and for 
technical and industrial collaborations), developing infrastructures for technological 
collaborations (e.g. scientific parks, consortia, etc.),  and promoting University-
industry linkages [70]. 
Considering them together, the three channels of globalisation of technological 
activities provide new opportunities for catching up countries, at the same time as 
they lead to greater risks of marginalization and increasing disparities in the near 
future. The crucial point is that, as the rules of the game change and the process of 
competition in the international arena becomes more demanding for developing 
economies, public policies must take an increasingly important role for sustaining 
  22catching up and knowledge-based growth in the globalising learning economy. As 
pointed out in an article previously appeared in Futures,  
 
A globalised economy is transforming the landscape for the generation and diffusion of 
innovation, but this does not appear to decrease the importance of national characteristics 
nor, even less, of national institutions and their policies. On the contrary, by magnifying 
the potential costs and benefits which will result from any country’s competitive 
advantage or disadvantage […] globalisation will increase the impact that national policy 
will have on domestic living standards [64, p. 122]. 
 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
 
3. Public policies and the international regime of regulation 
The previous section has focused on some of the major characteristics of the new 
ICT-based technological paradigm. Table 1 summarizes the main changes in the 
patterns of production and distribution that characterize the so-called fifth long wave 
period. In a nutshell, the economy is becoming more information intensive, more 
based on intangible assets and advanced knowledge and skills (both technological and 
non-technological), and progressively more dependent on new and emerging services 
and less on traditional manufacturing activities. Human knowledge and capabilities, 
and more specifically firms’ technological knowledge and organizational capabilities, 
and advanced users’ competencies, are increasingly becoming the crucial factors of 
competitive advantage in the international arena. Relatedly, knowledge-based 
competition in the global economy requires a rapid adaptation to the new forms of 
collaboration and competition that the changing organizational patterns (e.g. 
  23networking and e-commerce) and the increasing degree of globalisation of innovative 
activities are leading to.  
All of these changes open up new opportunities for developing countries, as these 
could activate a process of catching up by heavily investing in the new activities and 
related skills and infrastructures, while the role of physical capital accumulation, older 
and more traditional infrastructures, raw materials and natural resources become less 
important over time. However, while the patterns of comparative advantages and 
comparative disadvantages tend to be drastically redefined, important challenges arise 
for catching up countries. The new technological paradigm is more requiring in terms 
of skills and of advanced education levels, so the risk is that countries that will not 
rapidly invest to improve human capabilities and skills will fall further behind 
[12,13].  
The previous section has argued that a key role in this respect must be played by 
public policies, which have indeed the concrete possibility to actively sustain the 
process of technological and economic catching up. In the fifth long wave, national 
science, technology and innovation policies, and more generally economic and 
industrial policies, have an even greater scope than before for fostering development 
[2,64]. The claim that public policies can effectively foster the development process is 
well recognized in the literature on catching up, and it is supported by a wide range of 
historical studies on the successful experiences of catching up countries in the last two 
centuries [5,9,74,75].
7
                                                 
7 These historical case studies have in fact shown the important role played by public policies, also in 
interaction with market forces, in the development process. A first important example refers to the role 
of public technical schools in promoting scientific and technological catching up of Germany during 
the second half of the 19
th century [5]. A second case is that of Japan in the post-war period, where the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) played a fundamental role in promoting a long-
term development strategy based on technological progress [76]. A more recent example is provided by 
the rapid catching up process of Asian NICs (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), where public policies 
(education, R&D, infrastructures, and industrial policies) have been important for sustaining structural 
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economic system discussed in the previous section are increasing the need for State 
policies to sustain the catching up process, recent changes in the socio-institutional 
system have significantly decreased the scope for public interventions. In fact, 
institutional changes in the international regime of regulation have assigned to market 
forces an increasing role in the development process, while the possibilities and the 
resources that the State has to concretely drive and affect technological patterns and 
economic performance have been dramatically reduced.  
The expression commonly used to indicate this set of changes in the international 
regime is ‘Washington Consensus’, which indicates the type of neo-liberal ideology 
and the related set of policies that assume that the best strategy to obtain economic 
development is through the free operating of market forces. Let us discuss in turn the 
major institutional changes that have characterized the international regime in recent 
decades, with special focus on the Washington Consensus type of development 
strategy, and the consequences that this has determined for public policies in catching 
up countries.  
 
A first important trend is the progressive liberalization of trade, and in particular the 
rise of long-term investments by MNEs. This is one major aspect of the process of 
economic globalisation, although this is arguably not a new trend but rather the 
continuation of a secular transformation of the world economy towards greater 
interdependence across countries [79,80]. In recent decades, trade liberalization has 
been promoted through multilateral agreements, where international organizations 
                                                                                                                                            
change and macroeconomic growth [68]. For a broad discussion of the role of public policies in the 
developing world, see [77]. Clark et al. [78] discuss the same topic with special reference to the case of 
biotechnology.  
 
  25such as the WTO (former GATT) play a central role, as well as bilateral negotiations 
between trading partners [81,82]. The progressive liberalization of trade tends to 
increase the scope for the international diffusion of knowledge and technologies, and 
this may obviously provide new opportunities for catching up countries. 
However, imitation of foreign technologies is a costly activity and a very demanding 
process, and not all of the follower countries have the necessary absorptive capacities 
that are necessary to exploit their backward position in international trade [10,83,84]. 
In this respect, public policies are necessary for catching up countries to enhance local 
capabilities and absorptive capacities, otherwise the advantages of the free trade 
regime will only be exploited by the more technologically advanced economies.  
The crucial point here is that while multilateral and bilateral trade agreements increase 
the scope for the international diffusion of knowledge, at the same time they constrain 
the possibility that national policies have to protect infant and emerging industries, 
which would be needed to enhance local capabilities and absorptive capacities during 
the early stages of the new industries’ life cycle. Forces making for liberalisation, in 
fact, 
 
constitute a formidable web of constraints on governments mounting industrial policy. 
[…] Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing and 
promoting a proactive industrial policy […] Catch up through infant industry promotion 
has always been the bedrock of industrial development, and as yet no clear alternative has 
presented itself [69, pp. 457-459]. 
 
In addition to this well-known long-term argument, there is also a short-term one: if 
inefficient and/or emerging industries in developing countries will loose market 
shares due to the competition of foreign advanced sectors, their negative performance 
will result in a loss of employment and, hence, aggregate demand [85]. This, in turn, 
  26may have a negative impact on productivity growth, and may therefore possibly lead 
to a vicious circle [86]. The free trade regime, therefore, presents as many challenges 
for developing countries as the opportunities it creates.  
 
A second important trend is the liberalization of worldwide financial capital 
movements, which increasingly take the form of short-term speculative transactions. 
In general terms, the role of financial capital for innovation, growth and catching up is 
certainly important, and it has been extensively investigated.
8 One common argument 
is that free capital movements provide with a greater potential role for external 
finance in the catching up process, both in the form of foreign direct investments and 
of lending. This has been an important factor for the rapid growth of Asian NICs, and 
particularly for Korea, Singapore and Taiwan [12]. 
The liberalization of worldwide financial capital, however, may also lead to great 
risks, as catching up countries become increasingly dependent on foreign capital and, 
hence, more vulnerable to international financial crisis, as the 1997-1998 crisis in East 
Asia illustrates [90]. More generally, the problem is that worldwide short-term 
speculative transactions may displace resources from long-term investments in 
productive activities. Recently, financial capital movements have grown so big that 
monetary authorities and national central banks have to devote significant efforts to 
keep monetary variables and financial markets under control, and consequently find it 
increasingly difficult to pursue other important goals such as promoting investments 
in productive activities, expanding economic growth and favouring the creation of 
new employment opportunities. When speculative movements and inflationary 
                                                 
8 A seminal study is that of Gerschenkron [9] on the role of the banking system for industrial 
development. More recent contributions, including discussions of the relevant literature, can be found 
in  [87] and [88]. Perez [89] analyses the same topic within a neo-Schumpeterian framework of 
analysis. 
 
  27pressures lead monetary authorities to the adoption of tight monetary policies, in fact, 
the resulting increase in interest rates slows down investments, and it consequently 




A third relevant aspect that is currently characterizing the international regime is the 
new system of intellectual property rights (IPRs). According to Granstrand [91], 
recent changes in the international IPRs system are leading towards a “pro-patent 
era”. One major factor driving these changes is, first of all, the shift in US national 
policies related to the patent system during the 1980s and 1990s [92]. Contrary to 
what was the norm in previous decades, less emphasis is now given to the static 
efficiency losses that the existence of large firms’ monopolies and market dominant 
positions may induce, and more attention is given to the dynamic efficiency gains that 
a well-organized patent system may lead to by promoting innovative activities. An 
important role in this shift has been played by the interests of MNEs, which have 
gained more and more power in recent decades, and have actively been pushing 
towards a strengthening of the IPRs system to protect their market shares and 
dominant positions. 
However, the new IPRs era is, first and foremost, the continuation of a long run 
secular trend towards increasing harmonization and standardization of national patent 
regulations through international conventions and agreements. The most important 
recent step in this direction is the TRIPS agreement established in 1994. According to 
this, IPRs matters shift from the UN-related WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
                                                 
9 With reference to the 1997-98 financial crisis in East Asia, Stiglitz [90] observes that the countries 
that followed this type of IMF-prescribed tight monetary (and fiscal) policies, such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and (later) Russia, are those that experienced the most damaging effects of the recession. On 
the contrary, countries like Korea, China and Malaysia, that reacted by adopting more orthodox counter 
cyclical expansionary policies, managed to recover earlier.  
  28Organization) to the GATT-WTO sphere of influence, where the US and other major 
economic powers have a more direct influence. IPRs issues thus start to be considered 
as part of trade agreements and negotiations, where industrialized countries have the 
interest to promote a more rigid system of protection of intellectual property to 
developing countries, and where they can exert a much stronger influence and 
negotiating power.  
Catching up countries find therefore increasingly difficult to adopt national IPRs 
regulations different from those established by multilateral or bilateral agreements at 
the international level, and this may seriously hamper the process of international 
diffusion of technology and the related capability building in the developing world 
[8,69]. All in all, the more restrictive character of the new regime reduces the scope 
for national policies, makes innovation- and imitation-based growth more difficult for 
catching up countries, and it represents therefore one major factor leading to the 
widening of the technology gap that the developing world has experienced in recent 
decades. 
 
Fourthly, there has increasingly been in recent decades a strong pressure for catching 
up countries to decrease public spending, budget deficits, and, more in general, to 
reduce the size of the public sector. In the policy view promoted by major multilateral 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, fiscal 
austerity and privatisations represent necessary ingredients of a good development 
strategy, as these may reduce the inefficiency, corruption and other non-market 
failures related to the functioning of the public system. The neo-liberal ideology 
adopted in the Washington Consensus, in fact, assumes that market-based competition 
will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and, hence, to a better economic 
  29performance in the long run. This type of market-oriented policies, aimed at a 
reduction of the size of the public sector in developing economies, has frequently 
been adopted by the IMF and the WB in the form of “structural adjustment 
programmes”. These have induced many poor countries to implement structural 
reforms that have strengthened the market system and, correspondingly, have reduced 
the provision of public services [93]. 
The drawback of these institutional changes towards a reduction of the size of the 
public sector, though, is that they have significantly decreased the resources available 
for fiscal policies, and have thus hampered the possibility to sustain the catching up 
process through expansionary fiscal policies aimed at the growth of investments and 
GDP. In times of stagnation, recession and financial crisis, in particular, active fiscal 
policies may still be important to give a major boost to the economy towards 
recovery, while fiscal austerity may render the consequences of the recession long 
lasting and problematic for the development process [17]. The Asian crisis in 1997-98 
provides a recent example in this respect, with particular reference to those countries 
like Thailand and Indonesia that followed the IMF prescriptions and adopted tight 
fiscal policies and public sector restructuring to overcome the crisis [90]. 
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Finally, another relevant aspect strictly related to the Washington Consensus type of 
policy is the flexibility of labour markets. This is certainly an important factor to 
explain the growth of US, and its rapid adaptation to the new productive system based 
on ICTs in the 1990s (e.g. [95]). The increased flexibility in labour markets is in fact 
                                                 
10 In addition to this, lending programmes conceded by multilateral organizations may crowd out public 
investments and, through this way, they may have a negative effect on long run growth. The recent 
econometric study of Butkiewicz and Yanikkaia [94] illustrates well this point with reference to the 
previous empirical literature on the subject, and shows that IMF lending programmes seem to have had 
a negative effect on long run growth in recent decades, while the evidence relative to World Bank’s 
programmes is ambiguous and not conclusive. 
  30an important condition favouring structural change and the diffusion of the new 
technological paradigm, as it makes it possible for skilled workers to rapidly shift 
from the traditional manufacturing activities where they were previously employed 
towards the new emerging sectors related to ICTs. However, the shift from the old to 
the new technological paradigm is a long and lengthy process, which is likely to bring 
drawbacks, risks and negative consequences in the short-medium run. In developing 
countries, these risks are likely to be much greater than it is the case for industrialized 
countries. 
One such risks is that a rapid process of structural change requires a fast and 
significant upgrading of the workers’ competencies and skills, otherwise they will 
find it hard to be employed in the new high-tech industries [39,40]. Labour market 
flexibility accelerates the process of structural change and, for this reason, increases 
the possibilities of occurrence of technological unemployment. Relatedly, a possible 
short-medium term consequence is that in a situation of rapid structural change labour 
market flexibility may provoke a downward pressure on wages of low-skilled workers 
[8], and for this reason may decrease consumption and aggregate demand, which are 
important factors to sustain the catching up process [86]. Thus, the supply-side 
advantages of a flexible labour market may be counteracted by the disadvantages that 
the latter leads to on the demand-side of the economy. 
 
As hard as workers have fought for “decent jobs”, the IMF has fought for what it 
euphemistically called “labor market flexibility”, which sounds like little more than 
making the labor market work better but as applied has been simply a code name for 
lower wages, and less job protection [90, p. 84]. 
 
Let us now consider together the important institutional aspects discussed in this 
section. The progressive liberalization of trade and of worldwide financial capital 
  31movements, the new IPRs system, the pressures towards a reduction of budget deficits 
and of the size of the public sector, and the tendency towards greater flexibility in 
labour markets: all of these trends characterize the current international regime, and 
lead to severe consequences for catching up countries. The major consequence, in a 
nutshell, is that national governments in developing economies are forced to play a 
less relevant role in the catching up process, as much of their power is being 
transferred to MNEs, International Organizations and financial markets.  
The Washington Consensus type of policies promoted by these major actors reduce 
the scope and the resources available for national governments of developing 
countries to actively sustain the catching up process, constraining in particular 
industrial policies (protection of infant and emerging industries), monetary and fiscal 
policies, and national regulations in IPRs related matters. Furthermore, these 
institutional trends inevitably limit the pool of resources that the State necessitates for 
promoting innovation-based growth in the new ICT paradigm, thus hampering the 
implementation of education and training policies, R&D and innovation policies, and 
investments in the new infrastructures.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
The discussion carried out in the previous sections points to a paradox. On the one 
hand, changes in the techno-economic system are opening up new windows of 
opportunity for developing countries, and are increasing the scope for a broad range 
of public policies to sustain the catching up process (section 2). On the other hand, 
however, institutional changes are leading to a new international regime where the 
scope and the resources available for State interventions are significantly reduced 
  32(section 3). This paradox suggests the existence of a mismatch between the techno-
economic and the socio-institutional system, in a period that marks the initial phase of 
a fifth long wave period. This mismatch makes the catching up process more difficult 
for the developing world.  The widening of the technology and income gap between 
rich and poor countries that the world economy has experienced in recent decades is, 
in our view, a manifestation of this mismatch. 
Increasing inequalities and greater divergence between industrialized and developing 
countries, though, is by no means an obvious prediction for the future of the world 
economy. On the contrary, the most notable recent successful cases show that a rapid 
process of innovation- and imitation-based catching up is indeed possible in the fifth 
long wave. The extraordinary performance of Asian NICs and, more recently, China 
and India, indicates that it is possible to adopt a development strategy where public 
policies, also in interaction with market forces, actively foster the development 
process by investing heavily in the new technologies and in the related infrastructures, 
capabilities and skills. 
 
The successes show that development and transition are possible; the successes in 
development are well beyond that which almost anyone imagined a half century ago. The 
fact that so many of the success cases followed strategies that were markedly different 
from those of the Washington Consensus is telling [90, p. 88]. 
 
Furthermore, taking a longer-term perspective, the neo-Schumpeterian framework that 
we have adopted in this paper points to the temporary nature of the mismatch between 
the techno-economic and the socio-institutional system. Looking back at what 
happened in the previous four long wave periods, in fact, neo-Schumpeterian theory 
indicates that the socio-institutional system has always taken a longer time than the 
techno-economic to adjust to the emerging technological paradigm. The temporary 
  33mismatch between the two systems has previously been a characterizing feature of the 
initial phase of long wave periods.  
Neo-Schumpeterian theory also points out, though, that once the harmonic 
complementarity between the two systems is restored, a new mode of development 
eventually sets in, sustaining growth and catching up for the following decades. What 
does this long-term perspective suggest about the catching up process in the decades 
that will characterize the so-called fifth long wave period? The optimistic scenario 
that this approach leads us to foresee is that after a long period of trial and error, 
adjustments, social turbulence and political struggle, the international regime will 
eventually evolve in a direction that will more actively support innovation, diffusion 
and catching up not only for industrialized countries, but for the developing world as 
well. When this will happen, the restored complementarity between the techno-
economic and the socio-institutional system will favour the emergence of a more 
equal and more sustainable mode of development.   
 
In this world, the optimists have it, not because they are always right, but because they 
are positive. Even when wrong, they are positive, and that is the way of achievement, 
correction, improvement, and success. Educated, eyes-open optimism pays; pessimism 
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Table 1: The techno-economic system: windows of opportunity and policy challenges 








Windows of opportunities  
for catching up countries 
Policies needed to sustain  
the catching up process 
 
 
Less importance of raw materials and natural resources, 
greater importance of human skills and knowledge 
 
Education and training policies 
Information intensive  
and intangible 
 
ICT-related infrastructures and communication channels 
(based on cable and wireless transmission of data) 
complement the more traditional type of infrastructures 
 
Investments in the  




Less commitment to the previous technological  
paradigm may enable rapid structural change 
 
Training and re-training policies  
to accelerate structural change,  






Decreasing importance of physical capital accumulation, 




Improving users’ competencies, and 
 
 
The increasing use of ICTs in services make 
standardisation less important, and leads  
to greater customisation over time  
 
sustaining user-producer interactions 
The rise of services 
 
The limited appropriability of innovation in services may 
increase the scope for knowledge diffusion within services  
and to manufacturing industries (the “efficiency” effect) 
 
Incentives to innovation, R&D and 
entrepreneurship; IPRs regulations 
  
 
Non-technological and organizational types  
of knowledge are increasingly important  
for the diffusion of advanced knowledge  
(“expertise field innovation”, consultancies and KIBS) 
 
Sustaining education and training  
in non-technical fields to  
promote knowledge diffusion  
The “network-firm”  Increased speed of knowledge diffusion, and 
rapid access to new and wider sources of information 
 
Large firms (MNEs) may exploit 
economies of scales in global production  
E-commerce 
 
Changes in the distribution chain may favour  
the commercialisation of products produced in  
peripheral regions of the world economy 
 
and distribution networks:  
competition and regulation policies are 
important to enhance market efficiency 
 




The international exploitation of technologies,  
the global generation of innovations by MNEs,  
and techno-scientific collaborations may favour  
the international diffusion of advanced knowledge 
 
 
Industrial policies to sustain foreign 
competitiveness of high-tech sectors; 
Policies to upgrade domestic  
capabilities, skills and infrastructures,  
which may increase the benefits related 
to the new forms of competition and 
collaboration in global markets 
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